Discursive opportunities and support for the Dutch extreme right in the 1990s. The case of the Centre Democrats revisited.

Jasper Muis
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam


The Dutch radical right party Centre Democrats headed by Janmaat experienced an upsurge in 1994 but declined rapidly afterwards. This paper seeks to explain fluctuations in the amount of public opinion support and the party’s ability to express its views in the mass media. Previous studies on anti-immigration parties and the role of news coverage only focused on explaining electoral support; I argue that the party’s amount of public claim-making should also be brought into question. Firstly, demand-side factors – growth in unemployment, and influx of immigrants and asylum seekers – are discussed. Secondly, supply-side explanations are extended with the argument that latent political opportunities need to manifest themselves in the public discourse in order to become relevant for the mobilization of support and attention. The predictions are investigated with longitudinal data from political claims analysis of NRC Handelsblad, opinion polls (NIPO) and Statistics Netherlands (CBS). Results show that negative reactions in the public debate enhanced the party’s access to the public debate, but significantly eroded electoral support. Rising opinion polls led to more claim-making. However, Janmaat was not able to increase public support by making himself heard in the mass media – claims being prominently visible or not. To the contrary, space on the public stage could only have been harmful as it gave the opportunity for widespread criticism. Thus, the CD appeared trapped in a spiral of discursive weakness. Two factors might explain why an upward spiral was never set in motion: Janmaat was not inclined to adapt his viewpoints or reframe his message in order to avoid public disapproval, and the CD was criticized when it was visible in the debate, irrespective of its message.
INTRODUCTION

In August 2007, the Dutch newspaper *NRC Handelsblad* refused to publish an open letter of right-wing populist Geert Wilders on the opinion section as the article is not a "well-argued and valuable contribution to the public debate". Commentators who do not agree with this decision argue that this might harm the right of freedom of expression. However, one can hardly maintain that Wilders is not able to voice his viewpoints in the Dutch public sphere. His letter is published by another national newspaper, *De Volkskrant*, a few days later. Wilders regularly attracts widespread publicity and stirs debate, for example after calling for the burqa to be banned (September 2005) and after asserting that a "tsunami of Islamisation" is engulfing Dutch society (October 2006).

Until 2002, things were completely different in the Netherlands. The ability of recent anti-immigration parties to express their viewpoints in the public debate and gain substantial electoral support constitutes a sharp contrast with the situation in the 1980s and 1990s. The right-wing *Centre Democrats* (hereafter: CD) of Hans Janmaat never succeeded in mobilizing a large amount of support from the Dutch population, nor had they a strong voice in the mass media. Just before his death in 2002, Janmaat complained once again that he had always been silenced by the mass media during his political career, this in sharp contrast with the excessive amount of attention for Pim Fortuyn. He declared that "in essence, I have always made similar statements. Whatever these members of List Pim Fortuyn might assert otherwise" (Vermaas, 2002).

Still, there were remarkable fluctuations in these two aspects during the 1990s. At the start of the decade, the party was in a position of what Scheepers and colleagues (1994) call a long period of "stable marginality". In 1989, the CD had entered parliament with one seat, but Janmaat was ignored by journalists and politicians. After 1991, this started to change. The unofficial and silent agreement of 'hushing-up' the Centre Democrats was questioned by political commentators. From about March 1993, the party experienced a "second electoral wave".¹

From January 1994 onwards, the party received considerable peaks in publicity. Media access to air its views increased considerably, but also a wave of negative reactions appeared. Especially Janmaat’s cynical reaction to the death of Labour Party minister Dales and his statement that Minister Ballin should resign because of his Jewish ancestry provoked a lot of criticism. Negative publicity also peaked in April 1994 after a local CD member admitted (on hidden camera) he had set fire to centres that provide services for foreigners. The expectations for the May national elections in 1994 were high, but it is argued that negative publicity has toned down the actual outcome (see e.g. Van Donselaar, 1997), although others state that downfall in electoral support can only be partially explained by negative publicity and scandals (Mudde & Van Holsteyn, 1994). The second half of the decade is characterized by the party’s marginalization and eventually demise. The period after the national elections in 1994 is also generally characterized by a more active role on the part of the authorities and

¹ The ‘first wave’ was the moderate electoral success in 1983 and 1984 of the *Centre Party* (CP) headed by Janmaat (Scheepers et al. 1994). The CP lost its only seat in parliament in 1986 and did not recapture any seats in subsequent elections. Janmaat was expelled from the CP in 1984 and joined a new political party, the CD, which was founded in 1984.
government in undertaking repressive measures (Van Donselaar 1997). Nevertheless, one of the very first occasions in the Netherlands that an anti-immigration party is allowed to hold a demonstration takes place in February 1996 (Fennema, 2000), when members and sympathisers protest against the severe difficulties they face in renting facilities for party meetings. At this demonstration, Janmaat asserts that the CD would abolish the multicultural society as soon as it would have the chance to do so. Because of this speech, he is convicted for incitement to racial discrimination and hatred in March 1997. In the parliamentary elections of May 1998, the Centre Democrats lose the three seats they had achieved in 1994. Therefore, the period under investigation stops in May 1998. There is hardly any activity of the party after these elections and in June 1999 the CD cease to exist. A new party is founded that goes under the same abbreviation, the Conservative Democrats but this party joins the multitude of attempts that signally failed. The CD does not participate in the elections of 2002.

The central question of this paper is to what extent we can explain these ups and downs in the extreme right’s fortunes.

Much previous research has addressed the general question why people intend to vote for an anti-immigration party and investigated both the influence of individual background characteristics (such as one's socio-economic status) as well as contextual factors (such as the country's unemployment rate). With regard to the Centre Democrats, the “profile” of the supporters and relevant contextual conditions has been extensively investigated and described (e.g., Buijs & Van Donselaar, 1994; Scheepers et al., 1994; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2003; Van der Brug et al., 2000).

This study aims to make progress in three respects. Firstly, I will focus on short-term dynamics. Considerable progress has already been made by enlarging the scope and using cross-national comparisons in tackling the question which factors determine the electoral attractiveness of right-wing parties. However, notwithstanding the methodological improvement of such a comparative scope, far less attention has been devoted to test hypotheses more thoroughly by looking at variation in time, instead of variation in space. The relatively static cross-national comparisons ignore that success and failure constitute dynamic developments over time, and therefore require mechanism-based explanations (Hedström, 2005; McAdam et al., 2001).

A second drawback is that until recently, the literature has paid limited attention to the role of the public debate as a pivotal factor that accounts for dynamics in electoral support for populist parties. Mazzoleni (2003: 2) states that "little has been written on how the media work as initiators or catalysts of popular sentiments, how the media content may voice sectional populist claims, or how the mainstream news media may act (or react) as paladins of the existing political order by restraining the wider diffusion of populism". Several studies took the role of news coverage into account in Belgium (Walgrave & De Swert, 2002), Germany (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2001) and the Netherlands (Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart, 2006; Lubbers, 2001), but these studies...

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2 The sentence was confirmed by a higher court in December in 1997 and by the Supreme Court in May 1999.

3 Other examples of newly founded right-wing parties during the 1990s that were not very successful are Burger Partij Nederland, Nederlands Blok, Realisten Nederland, Patriottisch Democratisch Appel and Nieuwe Nationale Partij.
only focused on electoral support; the amount of ‘freedom of expression’ of the party
is not investigated. I argue we should not only explain why certain anti-immigration
parties attract more voters than others, but also why right wing actors are at certain
moments far more successful in making their voices heard in the public sphere in the
first place. Thus, in this paper, the trends in the success of CD will refer to two ele-
ments: the amount of public opinion support, as expressed by the number of people
who intend to vote for this anti-immigration party, and the amount of public claim-
making by Janmaat and his party, which indicates the extent to which he was able to
publicly express his opinions and views in the mass media.

Thirdly, this paper aims to improve our understanding of the successes and failures of
right-wing parties by integrating theoretical mechanisms and research findings on
‘discursive opportunities’, a concept which originates in the social movement field
(Ferree et al. 2002; Koopmans & Olzak 2004). Media-related independent variables
used in previous studies are the amount of coverage on the issues of populist right-
wing parties (most predominantly the issue of immigration and integration of ethnic
minorities) or the amount of coverage devoted to the political party in question. A
discursive opportunity approach generates more differentiated and actor-centred hy-
potheses about the influence of the debate in the public sphere.

This paper is divided into five sections. The next section discusses the various expla-
nations for success and failure of anti-immigration parties. Part three describes the
data and operationalization of the variables. Part four presents the results. The paper
concludes with a summary and discussion of the findings.

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Explanations for extreme right success and failure

Explanations for the success and failure of populist right-wing parties can be grouped
into so-called demand-side and supply-side factors (Koopmans et al., 2005; Rydgren,
2007; Van der Brug & Fennema, 2007). The demand-side refers to the number of citi-
zens that are susceptible to the message of an extreme right party. Mobilization of the
radical right is seen as the product of value change and structural cleavages related to
the modernization process that have created an “electoral reservoir”. Although suffi-
cient demand seems a necessary prerequisite for an anti-immigration party, in order to
be successful, it also needs to supply an attractive product and compete with the other
parties. Supply-side factors can be distinguished in internal and external supply-side
factors (Mudde, 2007). Internal supply side factors are factors within the party itself,
like its leadership, organization, strategy and ideology. External supply-side explana-
tions stress that the capacity to mobilize depends on the “political opportunity struc-
ture”, opportunities and constraints offered by the political-institutional setting (e.g.
Kriesi et al. 1995; Kitschelt, 1995; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994).

Demand-side explanations: Socio-economic conditions and grievances

Much of the previous academic work portrays radical right parties as the product of
demand-side processes, specifically the demands of voters. A key notion is that the
successes of these parties are dependent on particular external social and economic
conditions, in particular increasing unemployment levels and mass immigration. Changing preferences, beliefs and attitudes among voters and the conditions that increase discontent among the people thus facilitate the emergence of radical-right parties (e.g. Betz, 1994; Eatwell, 2000; Ignazi, 2003). According to an economic grievance argument, the potential electorate wants to express dissatisfaction with the country’s economy (Ivarsflaten, 2008) and consists of so-called ‘losers of modernization’ (Betz 1994) who belong to the underclass, are stuck in unemployment, and run the risk of becoming superfluous for society. In this current of thought, the decline in support for the CD after 1994 could be explained by the improved economic situation. Lucardie (2000: 8), for example, states that “there is an obvious relationship between unemployment and sympathy for right-wing extremism” and argues that the Dutch working class and unemployed experience relative prosperity and social security (see likewise Irwin & Van Holsteyn, 1999). However, several studies show that the unemployment rate is a rather bad predictor of cross-national variation in success of right-wing parties (e.g. Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Lubbers et al., 2002). The most extensive empirical study of the extreme right in the 1990s (Lubbers, 2001) concludes that Dutch voters care about the direction in which the rate moves, rather than the absolute level of unemployment.

Hypothesis 1a: Claim-making and public opinion support is likely to increase when unemployment grows.

Ethnic competition theory (Olzak, 1992) holds that support for radical-right parties is generated by an increased perceived threat by immigrants. The key assumption is that ethnic boundaries are reinforced when the actual competition for scarce resources intensifies. In this view, a high influx of immigrants may increase the perception (justified or not) of voters that they have to compete with immigrants for jobs, housing and welfare (Scheepers et al., 2002). In Germany, Lubbers & Scheepers (2001) found that the popularity for extreme right-wing parties was greater in periods when the number of asylum seekers was high. The relationship between high immigration and voting for the extreme right seems at first sight to be confirmed by the success of the Centre Democrats in cities with a high percentage of foreigners during the local elections of March 1994. In several districts of Rotterdam with a high density of immigrants the extreme right achieved more than 20 percent of the vote (Ignazi, 2003). Particularly in 1993 and 1994 Dutch society had been faced with a growing number of asylum seekers. I will also hypothesize an interaction effect: rises in employment will particularly have an effect when immigration and the influx of asylum seekers is high (see also Golder 2003).

Hypothesis 1b: Claim-making and public opinion support is likely to increase when unemployment grows and the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers is high.

Hypothesis 2: Claim-making and public opinion support is likely to increase when the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers grows.

A primarily socio-economic or ethnic competition approach has problems explaining short-term electoral dynamics (Eatwell, 1998; Norris, 2005). If we take a closer look at the grievances, the figures seem rather at odds with the demise of the CD in 1998. The number of people who felt that immigrants should (completely or to a large extent) adapt to Dutch culture indicates that there has been widespread and rather stable support for a more assimilationist approach to integration policies during the nineties,
at 54 per cent in 1990 and 53 per cent in 1998 (CBS, 2006). The same conclusion is derived when we look at opinions on multiculturalism (Fennema & Van der Brug, 2006) or ethnic discrimination (Coenders et al., 2006). We have to conclude that the potential electoral support for an anti-immigration party like the CD was available throughout the 1990s. This implies that the explanation needs to go beyond the socio-structural model of voting behaviour, since the electoral reservoir to be exploited by far-right political parties did not vary much in time and hence cannot fully account for the rapid mobilization and demobilization of voters and attention. After the elections in 1998, when the CD disappeared from the political scene, the political elite was relieved, but among commentators there was widespread agreement that there was certainly not a lack of 'demand' and that the failure of Janmaat was mainly due to supply-side factors. Therefore, in the near future a new storm of protest and discontent was to be expected (Van Holsteyn & Mudde, 1998).

Internal supply-side explanation: Party characteristics

An extreme right party's mobilization success not only depends on the presence of a beneficial 'electoral potential', but the internal organization and resources are critical as well. It matters how well a party manages to exploit the opportunities that present themselves (Kitschelt 1995: 71). A political party meets severe problems if it cannot mobilize a sufficient number of loyal activists putting up posters and distributing leaflets (see e.g. McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Party characteristics such as organizational weakness, lack of an appealing leadership and shortfall of active membership have been proposed frequently as pivotal factors that explain why the CD collapsed. According to Lucardie (2000), Janmaat ran his party almost like a 'family business'. His leadership style alienated party cadre, especially the more ambitious and competent members.

De Witte & Klandermans (2000: 713) identify a “circle of organisational weakness”: strong organizations (like Vlaams Blok in Belgium) become stronger, and the weak organizations (like the CD) remain weak. From a weak position (without support in terms of voting or active participation) it is difficult to mobilize voters or attract new participants to become active in the party. Thus, stagnation or even a downward spiral results once the party lacks the means to inform and persuade others. A lack of organizational unity is assumed to both cause and result from mobilization failure.

Hypothesis 3: Claim-making and public opinion support is likely to decrease when the organizational fragmentation increases (when members of the organization ‘defect’).

Charisma of the party leader is a prominent supply-side explanation in the academic literature (e.g., Husbands, 1998; Eatwell, 2003). De Witte & Klandermans (2000) argue that a more charismatic leader who would be able to maintain peace in the organisation might eventually set in motion an upward spiral akin to that witnessed in Flanders. Likewise, Lubbers et al. (2002) conclude that the Dutch extreme right parties in the Netherlands have not been appealing to the electorate as they lacked well-organised party structures and charismatic leaders (see also Scheepers et al. 2003: 85). This is in line with public perception. The journalist Ephimenco (1998), for example, describes Janmaat as having as much charisma as a "worn-out sandal".
However, the common-sense explanation that Janmaat’s failure is simply due to a lack of charisma lacks empirical evidence (Van der Brug & Mughan, 2004) and is rather tautological (Van der Brug et al. 2005). Although I will not contest the observation that Janmaat lacked exceptional appeal, it should be considered as a situational factor, instead of the core explanatory factor. According to Weber (1947 [1921]) charisma is legitimization for those who appear to be the “heroes of a war” and emerges in situations of crisis, insecurity or malaise. Weber illustrates this by noting that even Chinese monarchs could sometimes lose their status as a ‘son of heaven’ because of misfortune, such as defeat in war, floods or drought. Instead of assuming that a lack of charisma accounts for the failure of Hans Janmaat, it would be better to ask: how did the image as a ‘tragic loser’ evolve? In other words: I consider the lack of charisma as part of my research question, instead of the answer.

External supply-side explanations: Political opportunities

Political opportunities consist of relatively stable institutional characteristics of the political system (e.g., its electoral system), as well as dynamic aspects of the political process. As this case concerns developments over time within one country, only the second set (the short-term factors) seems relevant.

Political space

The unique selling point of radical right parties is their view on the issue of the multicultural society. An important aspect of the opportunity structure is whether established parties already occupy the electoral terrain of the radical right. Their position affects the openness of a political system to new anti-immigrant parties (Arzheimer & Carter, 2006; Kitschelt, 1995; Koopmans et al., 2005). Koopmans et al. (2005) show that there was a moderate space on the right that could potentially be exploited, because established left and right parties occupied positions relatively close to one another on immigration and integration issues. In contrast, according to Ignazi (2003: 211) the position of the conservative liberal VVD, the mainstream rightwing party could be an (additional) explanation for the fact that the CD lost all the seats in the 1998 elections: “the adoption of a tough position on the immigration issue and the articulation of anti-tax sentiments by the VVD undermined the position of the CD” (see also Van der Brug et al. 2000). Bolkestein (former leader of the VVD) claimed that immigrants should adapt to Dutch culture and delivered a speech in which he stated that Islam and western values are irreconcilable. Bolkestein’s comments were fiercely contested by multiculturalists, but he also received a surprising level of support during the elections. Party leader Janmaat was well aware of this. He claimed his votes were ‘stolen’ by Bolkestein and “moreover, the press has placed him [Bolkestein] on a pedestal, while the CD is hushed-up” (Op den Brouw, 1995). Alternatively, it may be argued that other actors, by making restrictive claims about immigration and integration, have enhanced support for the extreme right and created further opportunities for claims making by Janmaat.

Alternatively, I have also checked if the total amount of anti-immigration claims by all actors (except the CD) had an impact, but in none of my models this variable yields significant effects.
Hypothesis 4: Claim-making and public opinion support is likely to decrease when the established right wing party VVD makes more restrictive claims on immigration and integration.

Repression

Another relevant element of the "political opportunity structure" are the prevailing strategies and procedures of political elites in dealing with challengers. These can either be repressive/exclusive or facilitative/cooperative (Kriesi et al., 1995). Measures of exclusion refer to general decisions taken by political authorities or the judiciary (institutional repression) but also include so-called situational repression, unplanned ad-hoc actions of the police (for a discussion of different forms of repression, see Koopmans, 1997). For example, in Germany the political elites have actively sought to keep extreme right radicalism off the political stage. On paper, the Netherlands is not a ‘militant democracy’ like Germany as there are no explicit repressive actions to punish extreme right or anti-democratic ideas that might harm ‘the principles of the free democratic order’ (Eatwell & Mudde, 2004: 197). Nevertheless, there are more subtle ways that have hindered the freedom of expression of extreme-right parties and organizations. What has been unique in the legal approach in the Netherlands is the systematic prohibition of public meetings on the ground that these meetings endangered ‘the public order’ (Fennema, 2000). The Dutch extreme right was practically unable to hold any public demonstration: when an extreme right party would ask for permission to demonstrate in a city, anti-fascists would announce a counter-mobilization (not always asking for permission) and the mayor would ban the extreme right demonstration for fear of public disturbances (Eatwell & Mudde, 2004). A possible explanation for the collapse of the extreme right is therefore the sequence of repressive measures. According to Van Donselaar (1997), the first half of the 1990s has been characterized by a reluctance to undertake legal sanctions against racist statements, as such actions could have the unintended consequences of delivering Janmaat “the image of a martyr”. Moreover, this strategy fitted in the habit of ignoring the Centre Democrats as much as possible.

Hypothesis 5: Levels of claim-making and public opinion support were decreased by repressive measures.

Discursive opportunities

Political contention increasingly consists of a battle over media attention and approval in the public discourse, like an act on a public stage (Kriesi 2001) with the electorate as the audience (Manin, 1997). Discursive opportunity explanations point out that radical-right claim-making and electoral successes are only affected by political opportunities if people become aware of them (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans & Olzak 2004). Statements and actions of elite actors need to become publicly visible. For example, in theory, the ‘political space’ for the extreme right might be very small, due to a restrictive position on immigration by the established right party, as expressed in the party manifesto or according to an expert judgement. In practice, however, this space crucially depends on the extent to which the party is actually able to voice its views.
on immigration in the public debate. Similarly, acts of repression that are not reported in the media have no meaning beyond the direct impact on the offender.\footnote{Also, repression to a considerable extent responds to the extreme right as \textit{it appears in the public sphere}. For example, the conviction of Janmaat because of his statements about the abolishment of the multi-cultural society, was explicitly justified by the judge because of the fact that the speech had been delivered in public. Otherwise, it would not have been offensive or punishable.}

Discursive opportunities refer to three elements: the amount of visibility, the amount of reactions and the nature of the reactions (Koopmans 2004; Koopmans & Olzak 2004). Visibility is defined by the amount of prominence that media gatekeepers allocate to a message. The degree to which an actor and his messages provoke reactions is called resonance. It is also likely to be relevant if responses are negative and positive: dissonance and consonance respectively.

Considering explanations for fluctuations in the party’s public claim-making, it should be noted that this variable can be subdivided into two sources: the actions of gatekeepers and the actions of the party itself. Firstly, a mechanism of inspiration or empowerment can be responsible: if people succeed in mobilization their hopes and confidence are raised still further. McAdam et al. (2001) note that when protesters’ demands lead to concessions it often encourages further demands and so on. Success provides a signal that it is worth undertaking certain actions again. Secondly, the actions of journalists play a pivotal role, as they eventually allow media access or not. Their decisions are shaped by so-called “news values” that indicate if a message is newsworthy (Galtung & Ruge 1965; Harcup & O’Neill 2001). The first hypothesis is the idea of continuity: once a message has become headline news, the actor remains in the media spotlight for some time. Thus, I expect that claim-making and visibility increase the potential for an actor to further diffuse messages in the public sphere. Furthermore, it is assumed that public reactions (whether negatively or positively) increase the speaker’s chances to gain more space for subsequent messages as it makes the actor in the eyes of journalists more relevant and the actors behind them more prominent.

Hypothesis 6a: Janmaat’s public claim-making was further enhanced by earlier success in public claim-making and gaining visibility.

Hypothesis 6b: Janmaat’s public claim-making was enhanced by negative and positive reactions.

The newsworthiness will also depend on support within the electorate for a political party. A party that scores well in opinion polls is likely to acquire greater media access than a party with marginal popular support.

Hypothesis 7: Janmaat’s public claim-making was enhanced by an increase in public opinion support.

With regard to the effects of the debate on the electoral support for the extreme right, Lubbers and Scheepers (2001) found that the amount of attention for the German extreme right in the month before the polls led to increased support. These findings imply that neglecting the extreme-right wing is more effective in neutralizing these parties than writing unfavourably about them. They argue that putting a party into a ‘bad
light’ might not work, as potential supporters of populist right parties will filter the news in favour of their opinion by the ‘selective perception’ mechanism introduced by Gerbner. However, this finding is based on a single measurement of overall attention. In the Dutch case, Lubbers (2001) found that media attention for extreme right parties did not affect voting intentions, this in striking contrast with the conventional wisdom that the collapse of the Dutch extreme right was partly due to a “torrent of negative publicity” (Van Donselaar 1997: 6) and “a certain demonization by the media” (Ignazi 2003: 167). This finding might be due to the fact that their variable (number of articles) taps media access for a party, but also includes the amount of critical reactions. I expect that claims of the CD consist of informing and persuading potential supporters and have a positive effect on the public opinion, and negative reactions are harmful. For an anti-immigration party, I assume that avoiding delegitimization in the public sphere is more important for the mobilization of voters than attracting as much attention as possible under the motto ‘any publicity is good publicity’. One of the main reasons that the Centre Democrats failed was that they had been considered an undemocratic party and an unacceptable player on the public stage (Fennema & Van der Brug 2006).

Hypothesis 8a: Public support was enhanced by claim-making and visibility of the CD
Hypothesis 8b: Public support was enhanced by positive reactions in the media and decreased by negative reactions.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data and dependent variables

The period under investigation starts in January 1992 and runs until May 1998. Thus, the analysis contains a (moderate) success and the inglorious demise of the Centre Democrats. The reason for starting in 1992 is a pragmatic one, namely the ability to make use of an extensive existing dataset for that period.

I seek to explain why the extreme right had sometimes more opportunities to join the public debate. Hand-coded content analysis data gathered by Koopmans and colleagues is used (2005; see also Koopmans & Statham 1999). In total 446 coded political claims were derived from articles in the NRC Handelsblad. A claim is defined as “a unit of strategic action in the public sphere that consists of the purposive and public articulation of political demands, calls to action, proposals, criticism, or physical attacks, which actually or potentially affect the interests or integrity of the claimants and/or other collective actors” (Koopmans et al. 2005: 24). A typical claim consists of an actor undertaking a strategic political action to get another actor, the ad-

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6 With thanks to Thom Dyvené de Wit, who was responsible for coding these data.
7 For more information on the structure of claims, sampling procedure and reliability, see especially Koopmans et al (2005:254-265). The original data-set variable is based on a sample: claims were coded from the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the newspaper (Koopmans et al. 2005: 260). I have added claims from the ‘missing’ days (using keyword search in the Lexis Nexis database) and added supplementary information to the original claims (visibility scores, evaluation of the object actors, and specification of the different extreme right actors).
dressee, to do something regarding a third actor, the object. Claims must be the result of purposive action and political in nature. The amount of public claim-making by the Centre Democrats is the two-weekly count of political claims made by the Centre Democrats, irrespective of the subject. In this variable, I will not include claims of members of the CD that ‘defect’ their party. Such statements will be captured by a separate variable labelled "organizational fragmentation" (see below).

My second question is how to explain variations in public support for the extreme right. Public opinion support for the Centre Democrats is conceptualised as latent political support for the party rather than actual electoral outcomes. Janmaat’s success in mobilizing public opinion support is the percentage of people that reported the intention to vote for Centre Democrats if parliamentary elections would be held the next day, using survey data gathered by NIPO (NIPO/Steinmetz-archief, 1999) which weekly observed levels of support for the various parties for the period under investigation.

Explanatory variables

For hypothesis 1 and 2 data with regard to unemployment, immigration and influx of asylum seekers were retrieved from Statistics Netherlands (CBS, 2007, 2008). Because these are monthly rates, an interpolation procedure was carried out to create bi-weekly rates. The other explanatory variables are derived from the newspaper data with political claims analysis, as explained above.

For hypothesis 3, the variable organizational fragmentation consists of the amount of ‘defections’ of party members. It includes statements made by CD members who announce their resign or refusal to take their seats in the local councils or decisions by the party to abandon a member. These claims are excluded from the dependent variable (claim-making by the Centre Democrats). Note that expressing loyalty (the opposite of defection) or other supportive claims of CD members for their party are included in the amount of CD claims. Statements of former CD members are included in resonance.

For hypothesis 4, the variable immigration claims by the VVD measures the amount of restrictive claims on the immigration and integration issue by the Conservative Liberals, the established political party with the most critical stance on immigration.

For hypothesis 5, repressive measures by state agencies against the Centre Democrats measures both institutional and situational repression. Institutional repression consists of general decisions taken by political authorities (such as a ban of a demonstration by a mayor) or the judiciary (such as trials and convictions); situational repression refers to unplanned ad-hoc actions of the police, such as arrests of CD members during a demonstration. ‘Soft’ repression and non-state repression (see Linden & Klander-mans, 2006) are not captured by this variable, but count as negative resonance (see below). Examples of such ‘unofficial’ repression undertaken by actors like counter-movements, companies or individuals are: “The workers union expels a member because of his membership of the CD”, “An owner of a hotel decides to not allow the

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8 This variable is based on a sample: claims were coded from the Monday, Wednesday, and Friday issues of the newspaper.
CD to rent congress facilities for a party meeting” and “The manager of a taxi company suspends one of his employees from duty because he has distributed CD leaflets to customers”. Also, verbal statements that legal action should be taken are not coded as repression, as they are not themselves measures or decisions, but only pleas for action. Repression should also be political in nature. This implies that when a member of the CD is arrested or convicted for insurance-fraud or drug trafficking, this event is not coded as repression. This claim is coded as dissonance, but only when the article also contains an explicit evaluation of the political party by the actor, for example the judge or a journalist.

*Visibility* (hypotheses 6a and 8a) measures to what extent claims were reported prominently. It is composed of the summed scored on four elements: reporting the article in which the claim appears on the front page, referring to the claim in the headline of the article, mentioning the claim as the first one in the article and repeating the claim in follow-up articles (within two weeks). The total amount of prominence during one time period is divided by the total amount of claims made by the CD. This is done in order to avoid confounding of the dependent and independent variable.

For testing hypotheses 6b and 8b, the variables amount of consonance (supportive reactions) and dissonance (critical reactions) capture all political reactions to the Centre Democrats, i.e. all instances of public claim making by other actors that are directed to or referring to Janmaat and his political party, except repression (see below). Resonance also includes indirect reactions, for instance, when someone urges a mayor to decide not to allow a demonstration organized by the extreme right party. Claim-making by the CD and the amount of critical reactions during a period are strongly correlated (Pearson’s r is 0.83). We have to conclude that there is a close relationship between the amount of public expressions of Janmaat and negative reactions of others. Including the lagged variables simultaneously in a multivariate regression leads to multicollinearity problems. Therefore, the amount of CD claim-making (during a time period) is subtracted from the extent to which Janmaat and his party are criticized. Dissonance is thus the surplus amount of negative reactions. So, for example, ten negative reactions in a week would lead to a dissonance score of ten when Janmaat did not make any claims in the media in the same week, but is seven in case he was able to make three statements on the public stage. A zero is coded for the amount of dissonance in case the party was ignored and when there were no critical statements referring to Janmaat or his party during a given time period.

The variable consonance will be left out the analysis, as across the whole period of study only 17 supportive claims were reported, so there is not much variation over time due to many periods with zero scores. Moreover, about half of the claims consisted of the plea or decision to not convict the party or forbid a demonstration. Four of these are made by other extreme right actors, so it is doubtful if they tap the opinion that this party should be considered as a ‘normal democratic actor’ in the public sphere. The observed lack of public support is in line with findings of Schafraad et al. (forthcoming): a relatively small amount of all news reports during the election periods in 1994 and 1998 contains exclusively positive attitudes (three and seven percent

9 In this case, Pearson’s r is 0.44. In the few cases that there were more statements by the CD than dissonant claims, the variable can take a negative score. Truncation at zero instead does not alter the results.
respectively). In my case, about four per cent of all claims from or referring to the CD are supportive reactions.

The explanatory variable public opinion support (hypothesis 7) is already described above as it is identical to the second dependent variable.

Procedure

The variable public claim-making is an event count; its values are discrete and non-negative. King (1989) explains why in that case an ordinary least squares regression (OLS) is inappropriate. Count variables are likely to display positive contagion: one count increases the likelihood of observing additional events in the same period. Observing both a large number of lower counts and very high counts (overdispersion) implies that we have more variability than for an independent Poisson process, and therefore a negative binomial regression will be used (Long & Freese 2006). For the first multivariate regression of claim-making, the variables unemployment rate, immigration and influx of asylum seekers are differenced, because my expectation is that changes in socio-economic conditions, rather than the absolute levels, affect claim-making. Moreover, these variables are non-stationary. The public opinion poll is log-transformed to arrive at stationarity; Dickey-Fuller tests show that none of the variables contains a unit root after these transformations (see Table 3 in the appendix).

To estimate the effects of the explanatory variables on the public opinion support, I use ARIMA, also known as Box-Jenkins transfer modelling (see e.g. McCleary & Hay, 1980), a method of analysis which is able to account for the autocorrelation in the data. The opinion poll series is made stationary in its mean and variance by log-transformation and differencing. The explanatory variables are likewise inspected, and logged and differenced in case of non-stationarity. For the ARIMA specifications of the dependent and independent variables, see Table 4 in the appendix. The residuals are ‘white noise’, which means that there is no remaining autocorrelation in the residuals.10

To be able to adequately treat the dynamic structure of our data, in both analyses the explanatory variables are lagged. The time sequence is a critical element in determining causal relationships: the cause (explanatory variable) has to precede the consequence (dependent variable). There is little theoretical guidance about the choice for the unit of aggregation and the specification of time lags. The temporal frame of the analysis is cut into units of observation of every two weeks. By aggregating over two week units, I assume that the variables are able to both capture relatively short-term media dynamics, and can reveal the effects of demand-side processes that operate slower. Effects are assumed to occur at lag 1, but alternative lags at 2 and 3 units will also be tested.

RESULTS

10 See McCleary & Hay (1980: 243) for a good discussion why the relationship can only be interpreted when the cause variable is a white noise process. This ensures that the bivariate cross-correlations between dependent and independent variables are uncontaminated by autocorrelation within each series. See McDowell (2002) for implementing ‘white noise’ models in Stata.
Before I scrutinize the public opinion polls and rate of public claim-making by the Centre Democrats with two multivariate regression models, I will start with a brief description of the two dependent variables. Table 5 (see appendix) lists descriptive statistics and bivariate correlations.

Figure 1 depicts trends in public opinion support and claim-making made in our media source. As described earlier, in the first half of the 90s, the extreme right party experiences an electoral wave. While the party scored about one percent at the beginning of the time series (January 1992), support in the polls had risen to five percent of the vote by the end of 1993. According to Eisinga et al. (1998), upward shifts in the electorate can be described in two ways: firstly, the CD becomes more socially acceptable (e.g. the party also attracts the higher educated) and secondly, a dissemination effect takes place (the stable support in the western part of the country diffuses to the other more remote parts of the country). However, the feared electoral breakthrough of the right-wing extremist party did not last long. In the national elections in May 1994, the party gains far less than had been widely expected: 2.5 percent of the vote (three seats in parliament).

Figure 1 also shows that there is a wave of claim-making in a relatively short time period (from January 1994 until the parliamentary elections in May 1994). For the total period, 135 claims are coded, most of which are made by the party leader Janmaat. Also several claims were made by local members and Schuurman, assistant of Janmaat and member of parliament from 1994 until 1998. Attention peaks in January 1994. Janmaat’s cynical reaction to the death of Labour Party minister Ien Dales stirs a lot of reactions. About one week later, he states (in an interview with Elsevier) that foreigners should not be allowed to hold public positions (for three generations) and that Minister Ballin should resign because of his Jewish ancestry. Not surprisingly, these statements provoke fierce criticism. That Janmaat gains more media access because he becomes more “newsworthy” can be illustrated with the fact that his further actions concerning the incidents are reported in unusual detail, like his claim that he demands rectification from Elsevier and the decision to send a letter to Ballin to explain that he was incorrectly quoted. The by far largest peak of claim-making occurs around the municipal elections on March 2. That Janmaat and several local members are able to put their topics on the agenda is, for example, illustrated by the headline of an article that reports a debate between the local party leaders in The Hague: “Janmaat does most of the talking during political debate”.11 The CD is also given ample opportunity to react and reflect on the election outcomes. The amount of reactions is considerable during the same period, ranging from the advice not to vote for the CD to the plea for a political boycott in reaction to the (moderate) success of the Centre Democrats. In Eindhoven activists throw a pie in the face of the local CD leader and in Rotterdam the local Labour Party leader states that it is “disgraceful that 10 percent of the electorate votes for racists”.

Besides January 1994, negative publicity is also strong at the end of April 1994 (a couple of days before the Parliamentary elections in May) because of a television programme that reports the story of a journalist who has infiltrated into the party. A

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local member of the CD in Amsterdam tells on hidden camera that he has set fire to centres that provide services for foreigners\textsuperscript{12}. Shortly afterwards, Janmaat and Schuurman are convicted for incitement to racial discrimination and hatred (04/05/94). That Janmaat is put in the spotlights is predominantly because of dissonance and repression, and not so much to give him the opportunity to air his views. Moreover, his claims are less substantive and focussed on his conviction and reaction on the internal strife in the CD. The peak in ‘defection’ of CD members occurs in the month of May 1994; several members of the CD resign or refuse to take their seats in the local councils.

**Determinants of public claim-making**

Table 1 shows the results of a negative binomial regression model with the number of claims as the dependent variable. The table reports the factor change in the expected count for a unit increase in the independent variable, the incidence-rate ratio (IRR).\textsuperscript{13} For example, in model 2 it is shown that one strategic action of the extreme right party in the public sphere increases the expected number of public claims made by the CD during the following time period by a factor of 1.22, holding all other variables constant.

![TABLE 1 about here]

In the first model, only the demand-side factors unemployment, immigration, the influx of asylum seekers and a first-order autoregression of the dependent variable are included. We find a strong effect of the lagged dependent variable, which indicates that the amount of public claims is strongly affected by the presence of Janmaat in the public sphere one time lag earlier. The relationship between unemployment, the asylum seeker influx and the amount of claims by the CD in the subsequent week is not significant. The ethnic competition effect on media access is not supported: worsening economic conditions and a rising asylum seeker influx seem not to have been favourable for Janmaat’s ability to publicly air his opinions\textsuperscript{14}.

In model 2 the other explanatory variables are added: the effects of opinion polls, visibility, dissonance, organizational fragmentation, repression and the amount of political space occupied by the VVD. The results show that public opinion polls (t-1) have a significant impact. The more public support for Janmaat, the more he is able to express his viewpoints in the subsequent week. This finding is in line with several political commentators who, referring to opinion polls that are gradually rising in 1993, argue that one should give Janmaat the opportunity to join the public debate. For example, Meines (1992) argues that that the tactic of surpressing the Centre Democrats to publicly speak proves to be ineffective as support for the party is increasing, despite the fact that the public can hardly take notice of Janmaat’s statements as he is kept out of the reach of camera’s and microphones.

\textsuperscript{12} This confession is not coded as a political claim, as it not a purposive action in the public sphere. All public reactions, however, are coded claims, as well as the public statement of a journalist that the explicit political goal of the infiltration action in the CD was to harm the party.

\textsuperscript{13} Transforming estimated coefficients to incidence-rate ratios is done by taking exp(b) instead of b.

\textsuperscript{14} This conclusion is similar when the immigration figures are used, rather than the influx of asylum seekers, or when it is hypothesized that these variables operate with a longer delay (2 or 3 lags).
Dissonance has a positive impact, which implies that in terms of gaining more media access any publicity is favourable publicity. Although not significant, organizational fragmentation yield an effect in the expected (negative) direction on the amount of public claim-making of the CD in the next time period. Repression does not have a significant impact. Also when long-term impacts are included (assuming that internal strife and repression permanently affects all following time periods), there is no significant effect. The general conclusion is that an increase in support from the general public (as indicated by opinion polls) and the absence of claim-making or public reactions decreased the party’s opportunity to diffuse its standpoints further in the public sphere.

**Determinants of public opinion support**

The second question is to explain changes in public opinion support for Janmaat’s party. The first model in Table 2 shows the predicted impact of growth in unemployment, number of asylum seekers and the interaction between these two factors. It appears that changes in the influx of asylum seekers did not affect the extreme right’s popularity. An alternative model with the changes in the amount of immigration instead of asylum seekers also yields insignificant results. I have also investigated models with more distant lags (2 and 3), assuming that these variables might operate with a longer delay, however, this does not alter the results either (not shown in Table). There is a significant effect of unemployment, indicating that an increase in joblessness was beneficial for the Centre Democrats. Unemployment did increase during the period of Janmaat’s rise from about 5 percent in January 1992 to about 8 percent in February 1994, and declined after that moment, reaching the lowest level (about 4 percent) in May 1998. The unemployment coefficient in model 2 (0.93) indicates an increase of 53% per one unit, so the rise in joblessness of about 3 per cent (in absolute terms) during the first half of the decade was sufficient to increase the vote share from 1 per cent to 3.6 per cent. This is in line with the conclusion that the extreme right electorate predominantly consists of people who are in a vulnerable socio-economic position, especially the lower educated jobless (Eisinga et al.1998). My results are similar to Lubbers (2001). He also finds that when unemployment increases, the likelihood of voting for the extreme right is greater; the unemployment level itself has no significant effect, nor do rising numbers of asylum seekers. And, also identical to his findings, the interaction between change in unemployment level and number of asylum seekers has a significant negative effect (at the 0.10 level) during the 1990s. This odd finding contradicts the expectation that the message of the extreme right is more compelling when rising unemployment is accompanied by a high influx of asylum seekers and is at odds with other empirical findings (e.g. Golder, 2003). My results are not in line with Boomgaarden & Vliegenthart (2007) – they find a significant negative effect of unemployment increases – which might be due to the fact that their time series runs until 2002 and extreme right party support also covers the strong rise of Pim Fortuyn that took place when the unemployment level was more or less stable at the lowest level of that decade (about 3.5 per cent).

[TABLE 2 about here]

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15 The calculation is as follows: percentage change = (exp(coef) -1) * 100 (McCleary & Hay 1980: 174).
In the second model in Table 2, the supply-side variables are added. Repression seems not to have caused a decline in support. When the intervention is lagged two or three periods (assuming the effect operates with a longer delay than two weeks) it does not significantly affect the opinion polls either. Claims that consist of CD members abandoning the party or being expelled (organizational fragmentation) exert a negative impact in the expected direction, but this effect is also not significant. Alternative models (not shown in the table) in which it is assumed that the two variables have long-term cumulative effects yield no significant effects. Cross-correlation functions and time series plots (not shown here) indicate that the main peaks in organizational fragmentation and repression seem to have predominantly operated parallel to, or following the decline in support. If specified as an immediate effect (in other words: in the same time unit), ‘defection’ severely harms the amount of public support. However, one should be cautious with the interpretation of the direction of this relationship. It can also mean that members leave when they notice that support of the public is declining. Part of the significant relationship might also be due to the fact that members and voters react similarly - namely, they both end their support for the party - to an external unobserved factor (like the infiltration story).

Remarkably, we have to conclude that Janmaat was not able to increase public support when his claims were more prominently reported. Visibility does not exert any influence. In line with the absence of a visibility effect, there is no positive impact of claim-making. However, as mentioned earlier, the amount of CD claims and negative reactions are closely intertwined. The average number of critical reactions is higher (mean = 1.28) than the average number of claims (mean = 0.72), thus, in general, claim-making was preceded or followed by a larger amount of criticism. The variable dissonance taps the extent to which the amount of criticism was larger than the amount of CD claim-making (expressed in the absolute number of additional negative claims). The larger the amount of critical reactions, the stronger popular support for the CD is eroded. Ceteris paribus, the impact coefficient (-0.11) indicates that one act of rejection produced an average decrease in support of 11.6 per cent. Expressed in absolute terms, it yields a decrease from 1.40 per cent of the vote share (the average amount of support) to 1.32 per cent.

Speculating on the reason why the amount of space in the mass media was generally proportionate to the amount of negative reactions, one could argue that the CD suffered from systematically being stigmatized as a non-democratic or fascist party in the public debate. This argument can be illustrated by the observation that even a relatively ‘moderate’ statement of Janmaat was met by fierce criticism, for example, his conviction in 1997 for racial discrimination for his assertion that the CD would “abolish the multicultural society”. Alternatively, one could conclude that Janmaat was apparently never inclined to adapt his viewpoints or reframe his message, in order to try to avoid unanimous disapproval.

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16 The original measure of dissonance (not subtracting the number statements of Janmaat from the number of critical reactions) yields a similar strong negative impact. In such model, due to multicollinearity the variable claim-making has to be excluded from the analysis. A model that only includes claim-making (excluding the negative reactions variable) yields also a strong negative effect (not surprisingly, as the correlation is 0.83).
Airing negative viewpoints on the multicultural issue by the mainstream right-wing party VVD neither harmed nor enhanced Janmaat’s popularity. This finding undermines the presumed harmful role of a narrowing ‘political space’ for mobilization on the issue of immigration and integration. It neither supports the introduction of “a code of political decency”, as proposed by Beckers, the former party leader of the Green Party (Groen Links). According to her, the statements of Bolkestein, the former leader of the mainstream conservative VVD party, about Islam and the overrepresentation of ethnic minority youth in crime encouraged prejudices and was beneficial for extreme-right parties.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This paper investigated fluctuations over time in the amount of public opinion support for the Dutch radical right party Centre Democrats and the party’s ability to express its opinions in the mass media. A few previous studies on anti-immigration parties have taken the role of news coverage into account, but these only focused on explaining electoral support. I have argued that questions on fluctuations in extreme right party’s amount of public claim-making should also be addressed.

Demand-side theories stress that unemployment and mass immigration make voters susceptible to the message of an extreme right-wing party. However, that demand-side explanations only point to the existence of a ‘fertile breeding ground’ and fail to provide an overall explanation “is clear from even a simple glance at the clear contrasts in radical right fortunes found between neighbouring states which appear to share similar cultural values, postindustrial service-sector economies, and comparable institutions of representative democracy” (Norris, 2005:14). In addition, we need internal and external supply-side theories, which emphasize the role of internal party characteristics (like organizational strength) and political constraints and opportunities (like the dynamics of party competition and characteristics of electoral system).

Of course, grievances, ethnic threats and political opportunities are important to explain why certain political changes are possible or likely, but they have to be made visible in the public discourse in order to become relevant. Therefore, I have used a discursive opportunity perspective which adds the argument that publicly manifest (rather than latent) factors produce and amplify mobilization of support and attention. To fully understand short-term fluctuations it is fruitful to consider a factor that is visible to voters and exhibits short-term temporal dynamics: the public debate in the media. A discursive opportunity approach should not be seen as a ‘rival’ theory that displaces existing explanations. Rather, it explains why mobilization can emerge and cease rapidly – on a scale of weeks or months, rather than years.

Results show that an increase in public opinion support improved Janmaat’s ability to make himself heard in the debate. This implies that the electoral growth during the first half of the decade further increased the ability to communicate with potential voters. Critical reactions by others in the debate did not harm CD members’ access to the mass media. In general, the findings support the idea that, for gaining prominence in the eyes of the media gatekeepers, “any publicity is good publicity”. However, negative reactions in the public debate significantly eroded electoral support. The only (external) factor that enhanced popularity was an increase in joblessness. Remarkably,
an increase in the influx of immigrants and asylum seekers did not lead to more support for the Centre Democrats, nor did the amount of political space occupied by the established right wing party. In sum, Hans Janmaat appeared trapped in a feedback loop of stagnation: he was not able to further increase public support by placing his topics on the agenda, regardless of whether his claims were prominently published or not. Claim-making, closely intertwined with the ups and downs in the absolute amount of criticism, did not affect the amount of support. Waves of dissonance, indicating the extent to which the public stage offered more space for criticism than for CD claim-making, were disastrous for the party’s electoral support. Two factors might explain why an upward spiral was never set in motion: Janmaat was not inclined to innovate or adapt his viewpoints or reframe his message in order to avoid widespread public disapproval, and the CD was systematically criticized and stigmatized when it was visible in the debate, irrespective of its message.

Following a discursive opportunity approach adds two fruitful elements to prevailing explanations for the mobilization of populist right parties. First, the identification of discursive spirals or feedback mechanisms extends the generally more static demand-and supply side explanations, which have in common that gradual trends and cross-national differences get more attention than rapid fluctuations. It is not clear how relatively stable factors indicated by political and socio-economic circumstances can explain the sudden mobilization of voters or shifts in attention of journalists within the space of months. They do not predict a surge in 1994; nor do they explain the sudden collapse shortly after. I share this dynamic view of analysing radical right party breakthroughs with De Witte & Klandermans (2000). My findings add that the difficulty of setting an upward spiral in motion not only refers to organizational weakness, lacking the ability to attract new members. Another important downward spiral was a lack of ‘discursive strength’. Even when the CD entered the public stage, offering means to mobilise a wide audience, it did not lead to more success. Once on the stage, the CD suffered from being criticized as an unacceptable racist party. The question remains if a break of the circle of discursive weakness had been possible if Janmaat would have been strongly inclined to modify his views or reframe his message, in order to sow division among his political opponents or avoid unanimous disapproval.

Secondly, in line with the previous extension, a discursive opportunity approach points us to the fact that the strategic moves of political players are important. If very radical and outright racist claims provoke harsh criticism and hardly gain any legitimacy, one would expect that in such an environment (combined with sufficient political space) a right-wing actor would adopt a moderate populist stance in order to mobilize anti-immigrant sentiments (Koopmans et al. 2005). This implies that extreme right politicians are partially responsible for their own successes and failures. Ignazi (2003) argues that a characteristic of a successful extreme right party is its strategic flexibility in order to exploit whatever favourable circumstances might arise. This is in line with Goodwin (2006: 350) who states that "instead of portraying extreme right parties as the by-products of forces outside their own control, in contrast they should be viewed as engineers of their own success". Mudde (2006) argues that sociological and economics-based deterministic studies have the tendency to see anti-immigration parties as dependent variables undergoing their fates passively, instead of arguing for these parties to be viewed as independent variables shaping their own destiny. For example, Coffé (2005) argues that total exclusion has led far-right leaders of the Vlaams Blok to adapt their strategies, positions and rhetoric. By filtering, softening and re-
writing strongly-worded texts they broadened their electoral appeal. It appears that it would not only make sense to differentiate between ‘normal’ and ‘unacceptable’ (Hooghe & Reeskens, 2007) or ‘neofascist’ and ‘populist’ (Golder, 2003) anti-immigrant parties (despite their common issue agenda) when we want to understand extreme right party successes. It might be fruitful to distinguish parties that have an adaptive strategy (maximizing support and attention) from ideologically rigid parties, in order to explain why certain parties develop into mainstream parties and others remain marginal phenomena. Why certain parties decide to choose a certain strategy remains a pressing question. The reason for Janmaat’s ideological rigidity might be the strong influence exerted by the radical wing in his party. At least he must have been fully aware of the possible consequences of taking the risk of modifying his views: in 1984 he had been expelled from the radical right Centre Party as his leadership was judged too moderate by the radical fraction.
REFERENCES


FIGURES AND TABLES

Figure 1: Time series of public claim-making of CD and public opinion support for CD (Jan 1992 – May 1998)

Table 1: Determinants of public claim-making of the extreme right CD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Claims CD (t-1)</td>
<td>1.317***</td>
<td>1.209***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment (t-1)</td>
<td>1.064</td>
<td>0.538</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Asylum seekers (t-1)</td>
<td>0.999</td>
<td>0.999</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unempl.* asylum. (t-1)</td>
<td>1.002</td>
<td>1.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public opinion support (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational fragmentation (t-1)</td>
<td>0.882</td>
<td>1.589**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (t-1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration claims Liberals (t-1)</td>
<td>1.076</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility (t-1)</td>
<td>0.876</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonance (t-1)</td>
<td>1.180*</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>α (dispersion parameter)</td>
<td>1.360***</td>
<td>1.082***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wald χ²</td>
<td>23.2***</td>
<td>35.4***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>log pseudolikelihood</td>
<td>-180.64</td>
<td>-176.07</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n= 163; IRR = incidence rate ratio; SE = robust standard error; \( e^{-2} \) = multiply times \( 10^{-2} \)

* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed test)
Table 2: Determinants of public opinion support for the extreme right CD

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ARIMA regression</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Coeff</td>
<td>SE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Unemployment (t-1)</td>
<td>0.987**</td>
<td>0.503</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Δ Asylum seekers (t-1)</td>
<td>0.007e^{-3}</td>
<td>0.151e^{-3}</td>
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<tr>
<td>Δ Unempl.* asylum. (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.411e^{-3}</td>
<td>0.373e^{-3}</td>
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<tr>
<td>Organizational fragmentation (t-1)</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.018</td>
<td>0.042</td>
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<tr>
<td>Immigration claims Liberals (t-1)</td>
<td>0.019</td>
<td>0.042</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Claim-making CD (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.006</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visibility (t-1)</td>
<td>0.066</td>
<td>0.066</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissonance (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.110***</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moving average (t-1)</td>
<td>-0.496***</td>
<td>0.098</td>
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<tr>
<td>AIC</td>
<td>157.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RMS (residual variance)</td>
<td>0.15</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ljung-Box Q (20 lags)</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: n= 163; SE = robust standard error; e^{-3} = multiply times 10^{-3}

* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01 (two-tailed test)
APPENDIX

Table 3: Dickey Fuller unit-root test for stationarity of dependent and explanatory variables (from Jan 1992 to May 1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Original series</th>
<th>Differenced series</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Public claims CD</td>
<td>-9.00</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support for CD % (natural log)</td>
<td>-4.52</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment %</td>
<td>0.95**</td>
<td>-6.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>-3.11*</td>
<td>-8.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>-1.97**</td>
<td>-8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unempl. (dif) * Asylum seekers</td>
<td>-6.84</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational fragmentation</td>
<td>-6.85</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration claims</td>
<td>-12.14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td>-10.74</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>-10.60</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dissonance</td>
<td>-7.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Test fails to reject the null hypothesis of unit-root (p < 0.05)
** Test fails to reject the null hypothesis of unit-root (p < 0.01)

Table 4: ARIMA models of variables used in analysis

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Transformation</th>
<th>ARIMA model</th>
<th>Box-Ljung Q (20 lags)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment %</td>
<td>Dif</td>
<td>MA(1,2)</td>
<td>24.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration</td>
<td>Log Dif</td>
<td>MA(1)</td>
<td>24.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asylum seekers</td>
<td>Log Dif</td>
<td>MA(1)</td>
<td>17.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unempl. (dif) * Asylum seekers</td>
<td>MA(1)</td>
<td>18.78</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational fragmentation</td>
<td>MA(1)</td>
<td>21.60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigration claims Liberals</td>
<td>AR(2)</td>
<td>22.95</td>
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<tr>
<td>Repression</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27.86</td>
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<tr>
<td>Public claims CD</td>
<td>AR(1,2,3)</td>
<td>24.40</td>
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<tr>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>AR(1,2)</td>
<td>21.44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dissonance</td>
<td>AR(1,8)</td>
<td>23.23</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The Box-Ljung Q indicates that the residuals are ‘white noise’

Table 5: Descriptive statistics and Pairwise Pearson correlations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(1) Public claims CD</th>
<th>(2) Support for CD</th>
<th>(3) Unemployment %</th>
<th>(4) Immigration</th>
<th>(5) Asylum seekers</th>
<th>(6) Organizational fragmentation</th>
<th>(7) Immigration claims Liberals</th>
<th>(8) Repression</th>
<th>(9) Visibility</th>
<th>(10) Dissonance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>0.72</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>6.32</td>
<td>9.072</td>
<td>2.727</td>
<td>0.32</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.34</td>
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<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.54</td>
<td>1.04</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>1413</td>
<td>1021</td>
<td>1.43</td>
<td>0.63</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.64</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sum (n claims)</td>
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